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This paper by Rick Evans, Larry Kotlikoff, and Kerk Phillips is clever and thought-provoking, 
and I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss it. I certainly agree with the opening lines of 
the abstract: “Fiscal sustainability is one of the most pressing policy issues of our time. Yet it 
remains difficult to quantify.” The question of how best to quantify fiscal sustainability is one 
that my colleagues and I at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) spend a fair amount of time 
thinking about. Therefore, I try to do two things in my remarks: First, I make some specific 
comments about the approach to quantification and simulation used in this paper. Second, I 
discuss CBO’s approach to quantifying the fiscal challenges facing the U.S. federal 




The Approach to Quantification and Simulation Used in the Paper 
 
The paper by Rick, Larry, and Kerk examines the probability and timing of insolvency of a 
government program that transfers resources from young to old, as in the U.S. Social Security 
program. The key elements of the approach are as follows: 
 
  The program has benefit payments that are fixed and tax collections that vary with the 
size of the economy. There is uncertainty about the size of the economy and thus about 
the amount of taxes collected. With fixed benefits and uncertain taxes, there is a 
possibility of the program going bankrupt. 
 
  When the program goes bankrupt, it can shift to one of two regimes depending on the 
simulation: One is a complete shutdown of the economy, and the other is a permanent 
shift to a program in which the benefit payments equal a fixed share of the wages of the 
young. Naturally, the second regime seems to me a more plausible and interesting one. 
 
  The model incorporates two periods with overlapping generations and rational 
expectations. The financial system of the economy has both government bonds and 
claims to risky capital, so the simulation results include an equity premium. The 
imbalance in the government’s intertemporal budget is labeled the “fiscal gap,” and the 
simulation results also include that gap. 
 
  The model is calibrated along some dimensions to the U.S. economy. 
 
This is an interesting setup. It lets the authors explore the interplay of fiscal policy and asset 
prices in an uncertain world, and the simplicity of the model makes its workings fairly 
                                                 
1 The discussion of CBO’s analysis refers to the agency’s analytic tools and estimates as of December 2011 when a 
preliminary version of these remarks was presented at an NBER conference. transparent. A number of the qualitative conclusions seem sensible: Higher precautionary 
savings extend the time to bankruptcy, and higher transfers reduce the time to bankruptcy. In 
cases when the bankruptcy of the program leads to a complete shutdown of the economy, the 
equity premium is roughly in line with the historical premium. Both the fiscal gap and the equity 
premium increase as the program approaches bankruptcy; therefore, those indicators provide 
useful signals that bankruptcy is approaching. 
 
However, there are several problems in trying to link the quantitative results of this modeling to 
the actual U.S. economy. One is that the modeling shows that a drop in wages reduces taxes paid 
into the Social Security-like program but leaves benefits unaffected. The true situation is not as 
stark as the paper indicates, however, because aggregate wages affect Social Security benefit 
payments as well as its tax receipts: When one claims Social Security benefits for the first time, 
the amount one receives is indexed to average wages. After that initial calculation, however, 
one’s benefits rise with prices rather than wages. So a drop in wages affects the program’s tax 
revenues more than its benefit payments, and indeed hurts the finances of the program—but not 
as much as suggested by the modeling. 
 
Another problem in linking this model to the U.S. economy is that there are other sources of 
uncertainty besides aggregate productivity growth. In CBO’s stochastic modeling for Social 
Security, we allow for variation in productivity growth, but also in other economic variables and 
in demographic outcomes. In a paper we published half a dozen years ago, we estimated that 
productivity growth was indeed one of the largest sources of uncertainty about Social Security’s 
finances. However, there was also significant uncertainty stemming from fertility, immigration, 
mortality, and various economic factors.  
 
A third problem is that the U.S. government operates other intergenerational transfer programs 
besides Social Security. If one cares about the unsustainability of current U.S. fiscal policies, one 
should care particularly about health care programs for older Americans; outlays for those 
programs are roughly as large as outlays for Social Security today and are growing faster. One 
could view those programs as being like Social Security in some respects but with an additional 
critical source of uncertainty—the growth in health care costs per beneficiary of those programs. 
All told, uncertainty about productivity is not all or even most of the uncertainty associated with 
U.S. fiscal outcomes. 
 
A fourth problem is that allowing for only two periods of life limits people’s ability to smooth 
consumption by trading with people from other generations. I am concerned that this limitation 
might distort the estimated equity premium. For example, since the consumption of the young 
can be driven to zero, should we not expect that the state prices for consumption would be even 
higher than they are? Are they held down because the young cannot trade with anybody? 
 
Addressing all of these issues and others would be even more challenging than what the authors 
have already accomplished, so I am not suggesting that they have overlooked straightforward 
alternatives. Still, given these considerations, I think the model’s value is primarily in suggesting 
issues and relationships to have in mind rather than in providing a realistic appraisal of the risks 
facing U.S. fiscal policy.  
 Indeed, the quantitative estimates may seem surprisingly benign to readers of Larry’s other 
writings or CBO’s projections. The authors estimate that the expected time to bankruptcy of the 
Social Security-like program is about 100 years, with a 35 percent chance of such bankruptcy 
occurring in 30 years. The fiscal gap—the difference between the net present value of expected 
revenues and expected benefits—is less than 4 percent of GDP in most of the scenarios and is 
actually negative in some scenarios (because of the regime shift).  
 
In contrast, CBO’s long-term budget projections imply even more significant risks and even 
larger fiscal gaps under current U.S. policies.
2 We publish long-term projections of federal debt 
under two scenarios. The “extended baseline scenario” is an extension of our regular budget 
projections, which are based on current law. Under current law, the expiration of the tax cuts 
enacted since 2001, the growing reach of the alternative minimum tax (AMT), the tax provisions 
of the recent health care legislation, and the way in which the tax system interacts with economic 
growth would result in steadily higher revenues relative to GDP. Revenues would reach 23 
percent of GDP by 2035—much higher than has typically been seen in recent decades—and 
would grow to larger percentages thereafter. At the same time, under this scenario, spending on 
everything other than the major health care programs, Social Security, and interest on the debt 
would decline to the lowest percentage of GDP since before World War II. That significant 
increase in revenues and decrease in the relative magnitude of other spending would offset 
much—though not all—of the rise in spending on health care programs and Social Security. As a 
result, debt held by the public as a share of GDP would increase only slowly from its current 
high level. 
 
However, CBO estimates that the budget outlook is much bleaker under an “alternative fiscal 
scenario,” which reflects what one might think of as current policies. In particular, this scenario 
incorporates several changes to law that are widely expected to occur or that would modify some 
provisions of law that might be difficult to sustain for a long period. In this scenario, the tax cuts 
are extended; the reach of the AMT is restrained to stay close to its historical extent; over the 
longer run, tax law evolves further so that revenues remain near their historical average of 18 
percent of GDP; and certain spending programs deviate from current law. Under those policies, 
federal debt would grow very rapidly. Debt held by the public as a share of GDP would exceed 
its historical peak of 109 percent by 2023 and would approach 190 percent in 2035. The fiscal 
gap in this scenario is estimated to be between 4 percent and 5 percent of GDP over the next 25 
years (equivalent to about $700 billion this year) and more than 8 percent of GDP over the next 
75 years as a whole. 
 
Clearly, current policies are unsustainable, and they appear more unsustainable in CBO’s 
projections than in the simulation results of this paper.  
 
The Approach to Quantifying Fiscal Policy Used by CBO 
 
Let me now turn from the paper by Rick, Larry, and Kerk to discuss what we do at CBO to 
quantify the fiscal challenges facing the U.S. federal government. We currently use four different 
analytic approaches: 
 
                                                 
2 See Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s 2011 Long-Term Budget Outlook, June 2011.   First and most important, CBO regularly constructs projections of spending, revenue, 
deficits, and debt. Three times a year, we publish projections looking ahead 10 years; 
once a year, we publish projections that extend 75 years, although we focus on the first 
25. As I just mentioned, those projections show that current U.S. fiscal policies would 
keep federal debt on an unsustainable trajectory. 
 
  Second, CBO regularly uses its long-term projections to estimate the fiscal gap. We 
define the gap as the present value of revenues over a given period minus the present 
value of noninterest outlays over that period, adjusted to keep federal debt at its current 
percentage of GDP.
3 As I just mentioned, the estimated fiscal gap based on current 
policies exceeds 4 percent of GDP over the next 25 years and 8 percent of GDP over the 
next 75 years. Because revenue has averaged 18 percent of GDP and spending 21 
percent, a gap of that magnitude requires a large change in policies.  
 
  Third, CBO regularly quantifies the effects of delay in closing the fiscal gap. For 
example, we estimated that if policymakers wait about a decade to change policies, the 
gap rises from 4 percent or 5 percent of GDP to around 8 percent—not even counting the 
feedback effects on the economy. 
 
  Fourth, CBO sometimes estimates the distributional impact across generations of waiting 
to resolve the long-term budget imbalance. In a report in December 2010, we estimated 
that stabilizing the ratio of debt to output in 2025 instead of 2015 would benefit the 
average person over age 55 today, hurt people not yet born, and have small effects in both 
directions on people in intermediate cohorts.
4 Of course, in weighing distributional 
burdens, policymakers also need to take into account the progression of underlying living 
standards. 
 
Those are the analytic approaches that CBO is currently using to quantify fiscal challenges. Let 
me offer three observations about what I see as the limitations of those approaches and some 
directions for improvement. 
 
The first observation is that all of the approaches listed above involve point estimates and do not 
explicitly address uncertainty. Indeed, almost all of our analysis involves point estimates rather 
than ranges or probabilities.  
 
There are some good reasons for that predilection: One is that the Congressional budget process 
operates with point estimates. Committees are given allocations of funds, and those are 
expressed as point values. Another reason for our focus on point estimates is that our 
methodologies do not readily yield measures of uncertainty. CBO’s projections for the economy 
and the budget do not generally come from formal probability models, so ranges and 
probabilities do not fall out naturally in the projection process; instead, they would need to be 
constructed separately. A further reason we focus on point estimates is that communicating 
                                                 
3 CBO’s calculations use a discount rate equal to the average interest rate on federal debt held by the public, which 
is projected to be 2.7 percent on an inflation-adjusted basis in the long term. 
4 The estimates depended in part on how the debt was stabilized—by raising marginal tax rates or by reducing 
federal transfer payments (which go mainly to older people). uncertainty in an effective way without obscuring the basic results is difficult. When we report 
ranges for our estimates, it is common for people who would prefer that our estimate be smaller 
to quote the bottom of our range and for people who would prefer that our estimate be larger to 
quote the top of our range, which muddies the public discussion of our estimates at least as much 
as it illuminates it. Thus, the practical gains from our analysis of uncertainty are often smaller 
than one would hope. 
 
That said, we think it is important that policymakers understand the uncertainty of our 
methodologies and our estimates, so they can take this uncertainty into account in their decision-
making. Therefore, we think and write about uncertainty when we can, and I will say more about 
that in a moment. 
 
My second observation is that, in constructing point estimates, CBO aims to be in the middle of 
the distribution of possible outcomes. I have used that phrase repeatedly when talking with 
Members of Congress.  
 
I am not usually explicit, though, about whether the word “middle” refers to the mean or the 
median of the distribution. In many contexts, the mean and median are probably fairly close to 
each other, so the distinction is not important. However, for distributions in which the median is 
noticeably different from the mean—say, distributions with long tails on one side—the best way 
for CBO to proceed is not clear. One example is our approach to projecting the unemployment 
rate. Our current approach captures, we think, the normal ebbs and flows of business cycles, but 
it may not adequately capture the risk of a severe slump like the Great Depression or the current 
downturn; therefore, we discuss the chance of such a slump as a risk to the long-run budget and 
economic outlook. Incorporating the possibility of such an event in our numerical projections 
could make those projections more accurate, on average, over the long run. Yet, the estimates 
would be too pessimistic almost all of the time and still far too optimistic on the rare occasions 
when a severe slump occurs. Would such a change in our estimates make the estimates more 
useful to the Congress, or is it more useful to continue with our current approach?  
 
Another concern related to our reporting the middle of the distribution of possible outcomes is 
whether we are aggregating different sources of uncertainty in the most effective way. For 
example, when we choose expected values for two variables and then construct a third variable 
from them, our projection of that third value will not be its expected value if the two underlying 
variables interact in a nonlinear way. Many of our estimates involve nonlinearities, so we think 
about how to cope with this challenge—but we do not have a good general way of dealing with 
it. 
 
My third observation is that CBO is working to be more explicit about the uncertainty in its 
budget and economic projections. Let me mention four examples: 
 
  One example is to show ranges of effects based on different parameter assumptions. We 
have been doing this for our estimates of the effects of fiscal policies on the economy, 
regarding both the near-term impact through changes in aggregate demand and the 
medium-term and long-term impacts through changes in potential output. Specifically, 
we have published ranges of estimates for various policies corresponding to different short-term multipliers, different crowding out of investment by government debt, and 
different elasticities of labor supply with respect to marginal tax rates. 
 
  Another example is our ongoing efforts to extend our stochastic analysis of Social 
Security to the rest of the budget. For Social Security, we have allowed most of the key 
demographic and economic factors that underlie the analysis—including fertility and 
mortality rates, interest rates, and the growth rate of productivity—to vary on the basis of 
historical patterns of variation, and we sometimes publish 80-percent confidence regions 
for our projections. In a recent document, for example, we projected that the Social 
Security trust funds would be exhausted in 2038 but that there was a 10 percent chance of 
exhaustion in 2030 or earlier and a 10 percent chance of exhaustion in 2059 or later. To 
extend this approach to the rest of the budget, we are strengthening the health care 
aspects of the microsimulation model we use in our long-term projections and then will 
try to quantify the uncertainty about health care spending per beneficiary under current 
policies.  
 
  A further example is our descriptions of our projections. Our long-term outlook for the 
budget, which we update each year, now includes a section on the budgetary risks posed 
by recessions and financial crises, changes in interest rates on federal debt, changes in 
demographics, changes in health status and health care, long-term changes in 
productivity, and catastrophic events or major military actions. We also wrote a separate 
issue brief about the risk of a fiscal crisis, which we defined as investors losing 
confidence in a government’s ability to manage its budget and the government thereby 
losing its ability to borrow at affordable rates.  
 
  The last example I will mention is analysis of the ways that alternative policies expose 
the government budget to more or less risk. We are engaged in a project now with Debbie 
Lucas and Steve Zeldes about the different amounts of risk in Social Security when 
benefits are calculated according to different formulas. We are also examining the effects 
of proposals to transform certain federal health care programs from defined-benefit 
programs to defined-contribution programs. Of course, policy choices that insulate the 
federal budget from risk may achieve that insulation by shifting the risk to benefit 




In sum, this paper by Rick Evans, Larry Kotlikoff, and Kerk Phillips illuminates some key 
relationships between fiscal policy and the economy that are important for judging the 
sustainability of that policy. Their paper, the projections of CBO, and research by other budget 
and economic analysts show that the current policies of the U.S. federal government have put 
federal debt on an unsustainable path and that the adjustments needed to achieve sustainability 
are very large. Illustrating the consequences of such an unsustainable fiscal policy is critically 
important work. 